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Friday, January 18, 2013

Visions: predicting our future by the book



Magritte


Who do you trust? I have asked this question many times and I ask it of myself each day. In this continuation of best books of the past year I will attempt to tie together a few of the connections I have attempted to make between those who I have learned to trust about not trusting ourselves and others.

I have an apology to make. For quite a while now I have been repeating a mantra on this blog, on many forums and websites, and in person to all who happened to be in range of my voice: “without data, you are just another person with an opinion”(originally attributed to Andreas Schleicher).

After reading Nate Silver’s The Signal and The Noise; why so many predictions fail--but some don't, I have learned that I have been giving out bad advice. So let me rephrase my mantra, without data everything is just an opinion; with data everything may or may not be based on the incomplete assumptions of the researchers or the data interpreters.



If my update sounds like a legalism, it isn’t. Silver has convinced me, through data and stories, that much of what we assume to be true because of statistics and data, isn’t. Or isn’t useful. Or if useful, it is useful because designed to create an outcome that is desired rather than an objective assessment of a problem or situation.

In his conclusion to what I consider to be an invaluable book, Silver gives a list of statements:
1.No investor can beat the stock market.                                                                                               2. No investor can beat the stock market over the long term
3. No investor can beat the stock market over the long run relative to his level of risk.
4. No investor can beat the stock market over the long run relative to his level of risk and accounting or his transaction cot
5. No investor can beat the stock market over the long run relative to his level of risk and accounting or his transaction costs, unless he has inside information.
6. Few investors beat the stock market over the long run relative to their level of risk and accounting for their transaction costs, unless they have inside information.
7. It is hard to tell how many investors beat the stock market over the long run because the data is very noisy but we know that most cannot relative to their level of risk, since trading produces no net excess return but entails transaction costs, so unless you have inside information you are probably better off investing in an index fund.




He then summarizes: “The first approximation—the unqualified statement that no investor can beat the stock market—seems to be extremely powerful. But by the time we get to the last one, which is full of expressions of uncertainty, we have nothing that would fit on a bumper sticker. But it is also a more complete description of the objective world.” Silver essentially asks us to distinguish between what a variety of writers have called some form of the distinction between thinking fast and slow (Daniel Kahnemans’ term as well as the title of his wonderful book). Humans are wired to want quick and easy descriptions. It is evolutionarily advantageous to do so in the world of the savannah of tens of thousands years ago. But while the wiring is still in place, the world we live in is far more complex. And a great deal of the complexity comes about due to the overwhelming amount of data that we are confronted with each day. Today, juts today, there will be more data generated than virtually all the data ever collected in the history of humankind until just a few years ago. (Sliver and many others on TED and elsewhere underscore this data on data). But we still look for the simple solution. Or if we do not look for the simplest solution, then we look for a small amount of data that will lead us to a simple solution. It is this cause and effect action on our parts which makes so many predictions seem laughably bad just a few minutes, months or years down the road. And tracing how this might be avoided is the theme of this book.





But let me start with a paradox. Silver is a McArthur genius grant winner for his successful work with data. His analysis of baseball stats and presidential and congressional elections is, for those who follow this kind of stuff, legendary. And yet, the man known to be a data genius has written a cautionary tale. Anyone reading it will come away thinking that what he or she knew they knew as true may not be. In fact, it may be harmful to anyone who bets resources on a business, or an idea, or an ideology.




I use the word ‘bet’ for a purpose. Silver has some great words on how professional gambles make it big or fail. And he should know. Silver spent some time as a professional gambler and reveals his secrets and his reasons for giving up this pursuit. He learns a cautionary tale and he seems to come out in favor of what another Peter Sims calls 'little bets.' Little bets assume we do not have enough knowledge or accurate data to go all in with any frequency. Instead, we should spread ideas and resources out to discover as many alternatives and solutions we can. The odds are almost always against a single big win; the odds are much better when multiple hands are played. But as Silver would point out, not always. And this uncertainty is what he demonstrates and then what he advises us to carry around with us inside our heads.

We need to be suspicious of unsupported information, but we need to be almost equally suspicious of decisions made with incomplete data, and virtually all data is incomplete.




Much of what Silver has to say is in part based on the tutelary god of statistics: Thomas Bayes. Silver devotes much time demonstrating how Bayes's theories on data should be the starting point for all who hope to use data to make important decisions of any sort. I am not adequately educated to go into an analysis of the statistical probabilities of Bayes’s work, but I can come to the conclusion, based on my own experiences with data, that what Bayes’ work demonstrates is that the statistics we use are largely guided by incompleteness and bias:

 As an empirical matter, we all have beliefs and biases, forged from some combination of our experiences, our values, our knowledge, and perhaps our political or professional agenda. One of the nice characteristic of the Bayesian perspective is that, in explicitly acknowledging that we have prior beliefs that affect how we interpret new evidence, it provides for a very good description of how we rec to changes in our world. P 258

As an avowed Rortian pragmatist, I think the word ‘description’ is  apt and useful. Statistics are just numbers after all. It is the stories, the descriptions, we have before the numbers are in front of us, that affect our reading of the numbers and then affect significantly the stories we then tell to others once we have ingested the numbers in a way that can never be objective or complete. We are, as Jonathan Gottschall says, story telling animals. And as Rorty so often said, it is our ability to persuade people through words that makes us what we are and determines what we do. Truth has nothing to do with it. So Silver, citing Bayes, demonstrates that the experts with data are all too often flat out wrong. Whether it is pundit on TV, or ‘experts' on the Cold War (also cited by in a good book on this topic), or in any other field, the experts are experts because we call them experts and they believe themselves to be experts. All too often, the data behind the title proves otherwise.




And now it is time to say why I think this point is essential, at least for me. I have been giving out bad information based on incomplete data. Here is just one issue in which I was swayed by rhetoric rather than data. Others, in which I was flat out wrong, will be the subjects of forthcoming entries.

The first is the most personal in several senses of the word. For many yeas I have been giving lectures and appearing in various media to share my supposed ‘expertise’ on the topic of college admission essays. Many of the entries on this site are devoted to questions about essays, most of them focused on essays written for highly selective colleges and universities.




While I still think my training as a writer and my experience in the field permits me to say some things about writing great essays I am now not sure I have the data to continue to tell students, at least in any general way, whist will make a good essay for the purposes of gaining admission to a selective school. Why? Starting this summer I have been doing some research on responses to essays. I have posted essay on my blog, on College Confidential and on quora.com. I asked for feedback and got some surprising results. In a number of cases, the responses from ‘experts’ were almost diametrically opposed in whether the words on the page were great or terrible. Some of the experts hated the essays. And yet some of these essays were significant actors in the students be offered admission to Princeton, Yale, Harvard, and Stanford. This taught me a coupe of things. First, I thought that great essays could be interpreted as such by anyone who is supposedly an ‘expert’. Silver taught me that the experts, like political pundits or academics whose expertise are foreign affairs, frequently get things totally wrong.




In addition, the responses to the essays led me to do some research on who are at the front line of gatekeeping at many colleges and universities. In the old days, the teaching faculty had a significant role to play in evaluating applicants to schools. No longer. Now the vast majority of readers of applications are recent graduates with degrees in higher ed. or in subjects often having little to do with the written word. On top of this most schools do not give an intensive training course in how to read essays. They do train people how to read applications but the essay portion is not given any intensive scrutiny in terms of testing readers on what they think a great essay might be. On top of this, the kinds of essays I like and promote are risky. In advice I gave for the US News college issue on writing essays I told students to take risks in no uncertain terms. “Take A Risk”. Period. I have been trained and have read enough from CEOs and other people at the top, that innovative risk-takers are the ones they want and the ones who will succeed at the highest level. But for me this often means stylistic risks. Creative non-fiction is the fastest growing field in creative writing departments these days and yet, if my research means anything, most of the people reading admission essays have little or no familiarity with the form. George Saunders or David Foster Wallace, or even Constance Hale write wonderful prose, but in ways that are not exactly in line with typical educational essays. So some risk takers will be hurt by being creative.




And finally, now that the need is for STEM people is being foregrounded, an essay that covers an interest or passion in medical research or engineering may not need a Faulknerian touch. To sum this up, there needs to be a great deal more context about essays before any general advice is thrown out to the masses. Like Silver’s movement from a flat out assertion in step 1 to a much more muted step 7, there is no general rubric for writing an admission essay that is actually all that useful. Each essay needs to be contextualized and if not, then following a how to in some book or essay on essays may have negative consequences. I will be addressing this issue in much more detail over the coming months, but I certainly learned that my easy short answer of ‘take a risk’ sounded good in a speech or the beginning of an essay, but it did not actually have enough data behind it to prove it useful for a number of people.

                                  Lady Gaga meets Julius Caesar

Let me end my review by returning to Silver: “If there is one thing that defines Americans—one thing that makes us exceptional it is our belief in Cassius’s idea that we are in control of our own fates.” The Signal and the Noise is Shakespearean in its reach. I don’t mean the prose is so lofty that plays will be made of it. Instead, Silver is aware, like Shakespeare, that hubris usually leads to a steep fall. Julius Caesar ignores data in Shakespeare’s play and things do not go well for him. Both Shakespeare and Silver underscore there is far too much data and we are far too self-deceiving for us to lead lives in control of our fates. I think he has proven his case. The last words of his book are ones I hope to keep in my head each day: to be “a little more modest about our forecasting abilities, and a little less likely to repeat our mistakes”. It is no accident that Silver ends with the word ‘mistakes’, those things we can learn from if we take the time to learn why we erred. Silver himself is modest about his many talents, but the book is one of the best of many I have read (for example, Dan Garner’s  FutureBabble: Why Pundits are hedgehogs and foxes know best), that ask us to look inward at our preconceived ideas and outward at the complexities that comprise the world. 



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